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There are widespread racial disparities in employment, access to credit, health, and 
education.  Many claim that the original cause is slavery and the subsequent Jim Crow regime of 
lawful segregation.  However disparities persist forty years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
marked the end of Jim Crow.  One segment of opinion holds that continuing racial discrimination 
prevents progress by African Americans and discrimination law is still a useful instrument to 
fashion remedies. Because disparate impact liability is based on an effects test rather than proof of 
discriminatory intent, it appears to be a plausible instrument for redressing disparity itself wherever 
it may be found.  
Ian Ayres (2001) has advocated extending the ￿discrimination￿ paradigm beyond the 
original employment domain; broadening the view of what can constitute ￿discrimination;￿ and 
heightening the sensitivity of tests to set off the alarm that an unjustified act of discrimination has 
occurred (Ayres, 2001).  His advocacy has been influential in public debate and has been 
persuasive enough to induce defendants to settle some large cases. Without winning a final court 
showdown, his doctrines are likely to transform distribution practices of the automobile industry. 
Ayres was successful in using his disparate impact doctrine to persuade the organization that 
administers the kidney transplantation regulatory regime to change its practices. The importance of 
these issues has inspired us to take a fresh look at the disparate impact doctrine. 
In a recent conference paper, Ayres (2004) sets forth his theory of disparate impact. A view 
of that paper provides us with the occasion to take a critical look at his theory and tests for 
disparate impact. His proposed test is actually a test for disparity and is irrelevant for settling the 
issues raised by disparate impact doctrine as the Supreme Court has stated it. Here we ask whether 
there is a well-defined economically grounded theory of disparate impact consistent with decided 
cases. Are there sound ways of measuring disparate impact, and is it wise to extend disparate 
impact litigation to most areas of economic and social action? We first discuss disparate impact 
doctrine as it has evolved in the area of employment discrimination. 
1  Origin of Disparate Impact Analysis in Employment 
Discrimination 
To understand the distinction between racial disparity in some outcome and the concept 
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of ￿disparate impact￿ of a practice for selecting persons for participation in a productive activity, or 
rewarding them, it is useful to look at the origin of this concept in employment discrimination law. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids intentional discrimination or ￿disparate treatment.￿ In the 
Griggs case, the Supreme Court held that liability could be established without a finding of intent 
to discriminate. But existence of disparity of some outcome like hiring or wages could not alone be 
the basis for liability. The court focused on the effect of a ￿practice￿ used by the defendant more 
than on the mere existence of a disparity. 
 
Congress did not intend by Title VII. . . to guarantee a job to every person 
regardless of qualification. . . Discriminatory preference for any group, minority 
or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required 
by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of 
racial or other impermissible classification. . . . The Act proscribes not only 
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which 
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
practice is prohibited. (Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 431 [1971]) 
 
Not all disparities are the result of intentional discrimination or a discriminatory practice in 
the meaning of Griggs. A practice may have a disparate impact on minorities but be justified as 
necessary to carry on the employer￿s business. There may be no alternative practice that produces 
an equal level of output with lower disparate impact and lower cost. This is the defense of business 
necessity. 
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 793 (1973), the Supreme Court took the 
opportunity to define a framework for disparate treatment in the light of the analysis it had 
established in Griggs for disparate impact.  Showing that the employer treats similarly qualified 
employees or applicants differently establishes a prima facie disparate treatment case.  The 
employer may rebut this claim by showing that there is a nonracial reason for the employer￿s hiring 
or firing decision.  The plaintiff may then attempt to show that this articulated reason is a mere 
pretext for discrimination. 
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The McDonnell Douglas court distinguished Griggs in a way that points to the 
accountability of employees as well as the employer. 
 
Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and 
background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be 
allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on citizens for the remainder 
of their lives. (McDonnell Douglas v. Green 411 U.S. 793, 806 [1973]) 
 
The employee in question, however, had ￿engaged in a seriously disruptive act￿ against 
McDonnell Douglas (Id. at 806).  This analysis looks at the employment relationship as potentially 
shaped by the actions of both parties.  This might include the negotiation of terms of employment, 
or the initiative of the employee/applicant in searching for the best opportunity for deploying his or 
her skills. Decisions, practices, and policies have special meaning in the case of matching people 
with organizations to engage in productive activity.  The consensus position as stated by a 
unanimous Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas is that employee productivity is the ground for 
the legitimacy of selection methods. 
Subsequent cases articulated a three-step analysis for disparate impact claims.  To establish 
a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that the facially neutral employment practice had a 
significantly discriminatory impact.  If that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate 
that any given requirement has a manifest relationship to the employment in question. Even then 
the plaintiff may prevail if he can prove that other selection devices with less discriminatory effect 
would equally serve the employer￿s legitimate business needs (Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 
440, 447, 448 [1982]; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 [1977]). 
The statements of the three steps usually made in commentaries obscure similarities of 
disparate impact and disparate treatment analysis. The actual statement of the third step in Teal 
and some other cases is ￿however, the plaintiff may prevail, if he shows that the employer was 
using the practice as a mere pretext for discrimination￿￿the same third step test as for disparate 
treatment in McDonnell Douglas. If the employer is not using a more profitable practice that has 
less disparate impact, one may infer a discriminatory purpose. 
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In his conference paper, and in his book (2001), Ayres extends this body of disparate 
impact doctrine to new domains. His extensions are not straightforward nor are his criteria. We 
now turn to his application of this doctrine to organ transplantation. 
 
2  Ayres￿ Impact on Organ Transplantation Practice 
 
Ayres writes, ￿Organ transplantation is a natural place to study methods of testing for 
disparate impacts.￿ (Ayres, 2004). A closer look will show that this ￿test case￿ for extending 
disparate impact doctrine really demonstrates why that extension is unwise. It is far from clear that 
the reform brought about by his analysis￿overriding antigen mismatch using immunosuppressant 
drugs￿is justified in medical terms. His narrow focus on disparate impact in transplantations 
misses the wider picture of the sources of disparity in health status between blacks and whites. 
Ayres￿ policy intervention in the kidney transplant arena is an example of the myopic 
search for disparate impacts and ￿discrimination￿ that he recommends be undertaken everywhere. 
Seeing a racial disparity in kidney transplants performed, he assumes this must be due to 
discrimination. Rejecting intentional bias as implausible, he finds the culprit in the disparate impact 
of one practice, antigen matching. Antigen matching does indeed select more whites as being good 
biological matches to receive donated kidneys. One reason is that while a disproportionately 
(compared to the ratio in general population) greater number of end stage renal failure patients are 
black, a disproportionately lower number of kidney donors are black. ￿[W]hile blacks constitute 
nearly 13 percent of the general population, 34 percent of ESRD (End Stage Renal Disease) 
patients are black￿ (Ayres, 2001, 170). 
Ayres makes two arguments against the antigen matching regime, one technological, the 
other normative: 
 
Advances in the use of drugs that effectively suppress immune responses have dramatically 
altered the impact of antigen matching: the likelihood of graft survival may now be 




Normatively, we argue that the equitable claims of black dialysis patients for 
cadaveric kidneys outweigh the marginal improvements in transplant outcomes 
associated with antigen matching under the old regime. (Ayres, 2001, 171-172) 
 
For Ayres, just because an antigen match to a white recipient may have a biologically more 
productive outcome￿a longer period before rejection and less need for immunosuppressant drugs 
with side effects￿does not mean the less ￿efficient￿ transplants should not be performed.  
Biological productivity is the standard implicit in the original United Network for Organ 
Sharing (UNOS) antigen matching criteria. It is not clear what other standard might be applied. In 
the employment context, the appeal to business necessity implies that the appropriate objective 
function is the firm￿s profitability in a competitive marketplace. If organ transplantation were 
￿deregulated￿ and opened to ￿free market￿ enterprise would the profitability or shareholder wealth 
of ￿transplant enterprises￿ be the proper standard? As the framework in Appendix A makes clear, 
the objective function used to define productivity plays an important role in determining 
appropriate allocations of treatment to persons.  
Ethicists challenge the right of economists to speak about standards in such delicate 
domains, pointing to the specter of wealth maximization leading to firms dedicated to catering to 
the whims of rich clients.  What criteria should be used to determine productivity once we move 
from the employment arena where a profit standard is clearly appropriate?  If patients could buy 
kidneys in an open market, some individuals who could not find well-matched organs would buy 
the best available but still badly matched organ and repeat the process when that kidney failed.  If 
personal preferences can defy nature, one could argue that a social aggregate normative welfare 
function should be free to defy nature for the sake of racial ￿equality￿ as well.  Ayres shows his 
readiness to engage in ad hoc balancing of conflicting objectives when he recognizes six point or 
perfect antigen matches as legitimately productive, but claims that there should be no preference 
for partial matches over no matches at all, both being treated by immunosuppressant drugs. 
An important feature of the kidney transplant system is that while transplants generally 
work better for whites (given current donor-recipient imbalances), dialysis works better for blacks. 
Transplants still may be superior to dialysis for many blacks, but for some blacks, dialysis is better 
than a transplant.  Case by case selection for matches might proceed by evaluating the best medical 
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￿technology￿ to use for each patient, given available donor matches. Retrospective disparate impact 
analysis might then proceed by developing models of the productive basis for these matching 
choices and forecasting their medical outcomes. 
Based on a standard of maximizing days of pain-free or useful life, one could determine 
whether there were ￿too many￿ white or black transplants. If blacks were being turned away for 
transplant matches while a great number of bad matches to whites were being performed, that 
would be a sign that there was discrimination against blacks. The years of life productivity standard 
would say that transplants should be performed on members of both groups (black and white), 
working in sequence from best matches to worst, so that the quality of match (and hence outcome) 
of the marginal black (the person who is just treated) equals the quality of match of the marginal 
white. Appendix A develops this analysis more formally. 
If whites generally matched more successfully, we would expect to see more white matches 
than black matches.  Ayres (2001), however, makes the claim that this productivity standard is not 
normatively correct.  Even if transplants to all blacks survive five years and transplants to all 
whites survive ten years, there still should be transplants to blacks￿assuming that transplant, while 
it lasts, does yield a better quality of life than dialysis.  If this policy were implemented, the ex post 
disparate impact analysis would show productive whites being turned away in favor of less 
productive blacks, indicating discrimination against whites. 
The years of life productivity standard was roughly the way the regime worked until Ayres 
persuaded UNOS to award points for ￿rare￿ matches, essentially bonus points to lower the weight 
given by the antigen matching regime to give African Americans a better chance of receiving 
transplants. An effect of the policy change has been more black deaths due to transplant rejection. 
Medicaid provides reimbursement for only two years of drug treatments to suppress rejection. 
When black Medicaid payments ceased, they went off drug treatment and died. 
Attacking one part of the system in the guise of disparate impact doctrine, Ayres ignored 
the rest of the system. One organization enacted the antigen matching regime and could change it 
when the disparate impact was called to its attention. But changes in one program were not 
accompanied by changes in complementary programs. Focusing on the most proximate practice 
￿causing￿ disparity is likely to leave other causes untouched and possibly to distort allocations 
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further. Disparity in access to medical care is likely the real culprit and not disparity in organ 
transplantation. One part of the system may be easily attacked by litigation while other parts are 
less vulnerable. In the kidney transplant case, it was not litigation, but persuasion brought to bear 
on one organization that changed the antigen matching regime. Changing Medicaid or access to 
early health care was more difficult or was not contemplated. 
The initial antigen matching method was developed in light of research into how to match 
kidneys to whites.  For biological reasons, matching to blacks is much more complex, with many 
more heterogeneous factors to consider.  The serological agents used for antigen matching were 
primarily developed in a white population and are not as reliable when used in an African 
American population (Institute of Medicine, 1999, 42).  African Americans exhibit much greater 
variability in their histocompatibility antigens than whites, making it much more difficult to match 
organs for them. Nevertheless, the fact that the transplant technology has a disparate racial impact 
could conceivably be changed by a medical research agenda that took redressing disparity as a 
priority.  Rather than ceasing to use the antigen matching method, one could press for research to 
take up the problem of how best to match to blacks, or for more research into immunosuppressant 
drugs. 
There are disproportionately more blacks in end stage renal failure than whites.  Why?  Is 
this due to discrimination?  A proximate cause in the case of kidney transplants is that blacks wait 
longer before being treated for the diseases that cause kidney failure.  One reason is a disparity in 
access to health care.  Lack of health insurance is in turn a major cause of lack of access.  There are 
many other possible causes. Dr. David Satcher, Surgeon General in the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations 1998-2002, listed some of the ￿upstream, midstream, and downstream￿ causes of a 
racial disparity in health: breakdown of the family, failure of the educational system, crime, the 
criminal justice system (disproportionately many blacks get infected with AIDS while in prison), 
bad health habits, lack of exercise, use of drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, lack of health insurance, 
and lack of access to health services (Tavis Smiley Presents 2004). The economic point of view 
asks: what are the relative costs and benefits of investment in policy interventions at different 
points in the social system which cause the disparity in transplants?  That question leads to the 
broader question: what are the relative costs and benefits of improvements in the transplant domain 
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compared with preventive health improvements that could be made in other parts of the total health 
system?  When the ethicist says that black/white disparities in kidney transplants should be ended 
regardless of cost, the economist asks how many more lives (black lives) could be improved by 
investing that money in subsidizing health insurance or preventive medicine interventions.  It is 
unlikely that systematic discrimination against blacks is at work in the case of kidney transplants.  
Blacks are not treated systematically differently in the case of liver transplants where compatibility 
issues are much less of a problem (Institute of Medicine, 1999).   
 
3  The Challenge Ayres Presents 
 
Ayres￿ claim that normative considerations should prevail over productive considerations is a 
direct challenge to conventional applications of disparate impact doctrine. His ￿technological￿ 
challenge is based on the claim that immunosuppressant drugs ￿dramatically altered the impact of 
antigen matching.￿ In the context of the disparate impact jurisprudence doctrine developed in the 
employment discrimination context, one way of understanding his proposal is as an alternative 
practice that has less disparate impact. It is an alternative technology, but not one that produces 
medical results equivalent to good antigen matching. His alternative trades medically beneficial 
outcomes for a decrease in disparate impacts. While Ayres borrows the concept of disparate impact 
from the employment discrimination domain, he has not found an adequate analog of the concept of 
business necessity that the Supreme Court regarded as essential to it. 
His approach assumes the desired outcome is more kidney transplants, not better health and 
not less need for kidney transplants. The immunosuppressant drug remedial policy counters a 
deficiency at one stage of the health production process. Transporting the disparate impact frame of 
analysis from employment discrimination litigation to transplants takes a litigator￿s view. It ignores 
alternative policies that might intervene at earlier stages of the process and produce a lower 
incidence of kidney failure. 
What does Ayres￿ discussion of ￿Three Tests for Disparity￿ have to do with his kidney 
transplantation recommendations? His revision of conventional statistical methods for measuring 
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disparate impact advocates eliminating variables that might explain why a racial disparity exists. 
He dismisses a complete model with a sound biological basis as suffering from what he calls the 
vice of ￿included variable bias.￿ In analyzing transplant disparity, he proposes to exclude the 
degree of antigen matching as a control variable. Evidently, it would not fit under whatever analog 
to ￿business necessity￿ Ayres would accept.  In Ayres￿ analysis, disparity itself is the problem.  
Whatever heroic last stage measures can address it should be applied, regardless of cost.  We next 
turn to Ayres￿ analysis of three tests for discrimination. 
 
4  Ayres￿ Three Tests 
 
Ayres presents three tests for discrimination which we now analyze.  Appendices B and C 
present a more formal analysis of the statistical concepts involved. 
 
4.1 Traditional  Test 
 
The conventional approach to testing for discrimination analyzes some outcome equation 
for a person￿a wage, an employment rate or the allocation rate of transplant organs.  Differences 
in outcomes between persons of each race are then regressed on measured qualification traits X, a 
race indicator variable D (=1 if black; =0 otherwise), and an error term to capture unmeasured traits 
and sources of disparity.  If all relevant productivity traits are measured, least squares estimates of 
disparity (the regression coefficient on D) are unbiased.  A negative estimated coefficient on D 
means that on average blacks do worse on the outcome than the benchmark group, either because 
of discrimination or because of lower levels of unmeasured productivity traits.  Defendants in 
disparate impact cases attempt to show that there are nonracial variables X that are legitimate for 
the business decision-maker to consider and that when these variables are included in the 
regression, the estimated coefficient on D is statistically insignificant.  Plaintiffs often attempt to 




4.2  Ayres￿ Omitted Variables Tests 
 
Distributions of some variables that measure productivity traits differ by race, for example 
test scores and degree of antigen match. That, in Ayres￿ view, makes them ￿tainted.￿ Ayres￿ 
approach to the tainted variable problem is to throw the tainted variables away.  Whenever he finds 
a productivity variable X correlated with racial difference D, his instinct is to throw X out of the 
model.  The result of this procedure is to leave the cause of the disparate outcome unexplained. 
Based on his critique of the ￿traditional test,￿ Ayres presents the ￿omitted variables￿ test as an 
improvement to prevent ￿included variable bias.￿  He actually has three versions of the omitted 
variables test. 
The first version looks like a test of a selection practice or criterion.  ￿It￿s inappropriate to 
control for these nonracial factors in the regression analyzing the impact of a particular set of 
decisions, because we want to see whether these nonracial factors produce racially disparate 
outcomes.￿  By nonracial variables, Ayres refers to variables used as selection criteria by the 
defendant that are not overtly related to race (Ayres 2004).  In the second version, he shifts to say 
that all nonracial variables should be omitted.  ￿Excluding nonracial factors is inappropriate in 
disparate treatment tests, but such exclusion is necessary in disparate impact tests￿￿ The radical 
omission of variables in the second version of his argument reveals that this version of disparate 
impact analysis is greatly different from disparate treatment analysis. 
If a disparate treatment regression fails to include (or ￿omits￿) a non-racial variable 
upon which the decisionmaker actually based her decision, then the regression can 
erroneously indicate that the decisionmaker treated minorities differently than whites.  For 
example, if (1) the decisionmaker has a practice of excluding transplant applicants with- 
out a high school diploma from the transplant list and if (2) we further assume that the 
pool of applicants without diplomas is disproportionately comprised of minorities, then 
omitting from the regression a control for whether applicants graduated from high school 
might bias the test of disparate treatment. 
 
Under a disparate impact theory, it is necessary to intentionally omit non-racial 
variables from a regression to test whether those variables produced a disparate racial 
impact. . . [T]he idea is to test whether non-racial factors might have caused a racial 




Ayres tries to draw a neat separation: disparate treatment analysis should include any 
conceivable nonracial variable that could explain the decision; disparate impact analysis should 
omit any variable that could explain the decision. 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 793 (1973), defined disparate treatment as treating 
equally qualified or similarly situated persons differently because of their race.  McDonnell 
Douglas stated that the ￿broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, 
is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and 
personnel decisions￿ (411 U.S. 793, 801).  Variables by which one determines ex post whether 
someone is equally qualified or similarly situated as well as the nonracial criteria that the defendant 
firm used ex ante to make the challenged decision must have some relationship to legitimate 
business purposes. Where that appears not to be the case, it is because of taking an excessively 
narrow idea of what constitutes relevance to business goals.  Ayres overstates the distinction 
between disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis. 
Variables indicating whether candidates for hiring or promotion are ￿similarly situated￿ or 
￿equally qualified￿ may relate to capabilities of, activities by, or preferences of, the person. These 
variables may not relate to the employer￿s selection practice, yet may indicate why someone was 
not hired or promoted. Actions or preferences on the part of the employee or candidate can have a 
causal influence on the consummation, terms, or output of the employment relationship. Ayres 
(2004) states that ￿More than 30 years after Griggs and a dozen years after the purposefully vague 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, there is still not legal clarity on . . . whether a defendant is liable when 
both the defendant and plaintiff￿s actions are but-for causes of the disparate impact.￿ Ayres￿ 
omitted variables test is particularly concerned with omitting variables not related to the decision-
maker￿s practice but which could explain the business decisions on the basis of differences between 
people such as differences in preferences and initiatives in the employment or matching 
relationship. However, McDonnell Douglas makes clear that action on the part of the plaintiff is 
relevant to disparate impact or disparate treatment analysis. 
Ayres gives the example of the high school diploma as a legitimate qualification for a 
kidney transplant patient in the eyes of a disparate treatment defense, but illegitimate under 
disparate impact.  He evidently believes a high school diploma is not related to the medical 
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necessity of transplants.  But a healthcare provider could make the case that it is.  Patients for many 
procedures have to be able to follow complex post-operative instructions, to take medications on 
schedule, and be vigilant and responsive to changes in symptoms.  It is entirely possible that more 
educated people can manage their own care better than less educated people.  
A high school diploma might not be a criterion the healthcare provider uses.  Perhaps 
physicians made a ￿subjective judgment￿ as to how competent a potential patient would be in 
contributing to successful post-operative care management.  An ex post analysis to determine 
whether there was discrimination might legitimately use variables that are proxies for ability to 
understand complex instructions. 
His ￿omitted variable test￿ for disparate impact is really just a test for differences in 
characteristics across groups.  By omitting all of the X variables that might provide a nonracial 
explanation for disparity, he is left only with race as an explanation for disparity.  See Appendix C 
for more discussion of this point. 
In his third version of the omitted variables test, Ayres (2004) claims that the test is a 
￿unified￿ test for ￿unjustified disparate impacts￿ and so may include ￿legitimate￿ nonracial 
variables.  The ￿basic idea is to include in a regression those variables that would reflect a valid 
justification for the policy in question.￿  The omitted variables test has nothing to say about the 
degree of medical necessity of antigen matching.  ￿[I]t is essential to have an independent theory of 
what types of factors might constitute a valid justification.￿  
The ￿independent theory￿ will transform the idea of business justification by balancing 
￿efficiency￿ against ￿equity.￿  ￿To ameliorate the disparate impact of a particular policy how much 
needs to be sacrificed in terms of survivability[?]￿  He performs the balancing simply by omitting 
or partially omitting the normatively unjustified variables.  In the transplant context, ￿for fuller (5 
or 6) antigen matches it would be appropriate to include controls￿as the degree of matching is 
associated with higher survivability.  Depending on whether the law or one￿s private norms require 
a trade-off or ￿accommodation￿ of equity with efficiency, it might also be necessary to cap the 
maximum amount that the coefficients on these variables could take￿ (Ayres 2004).  ￿Valid 
justification￿ means normatively as well as productively valid.  He reveals his aim at the close of 
his paper in discussing the third stage of disparate impact analysis: consideration of whether there 
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is an alternative practice that accomplishes ￿legitimate business interests while producing a less 
disparate racial impact.￿  This ￿might be done as a more of an accomodationist exercise where 
researchers would investigate how much of a reduction in disparity could be accomplished by 
demanding that ￿employers marginally sacrifice some of what would otherwise be their legitimate 
interests.￿  That is not the law, but by wielding burden of proof requirements, defendants can be 
intimidated into settling cases or preventing litigation by de facto quotas.  Thus Ayres￿ innovation 
is immediately to put the burden of proof on the defendant through the uncontrolled version of the 
omitted variables test, and then to set a narrow definition of what constitutes a legitimate business 
purpose.  
Ayres claims that antigen matching has a disparate impact.  He has not proved that it is not 
business justified nor has he clarified that concept in the transplant setting.  The omitted variables 
￿test￿ only measures disparity in traits between groups.  The test does not detect the source of the 
disparity nor does it determine whether a trait used to employ, pay, promote or assign an organ is a 
legitimate variable.  It does not necessarily identify discrimination or disparate impact not justified 
by productivity or other legitimate business reasons.  We spell these arguments out more formally 
in Appendix C. 
 
4.3  Becker￿s Outcomes Test 
 
Ayres looks to Gary Becker￿s outcomes test to grapple with the question of when a 
disparity may be ￿justified by heightened institutional productivity.￿  The essential idea of 
Becker￿s outcomes test (Becker, 1993a,b) is captured by the phrase that ￿a woman, or a black or a 
Jew has to be better to get a white man￿s job.￿  If the marginal profitability or productivity is 
higher for a black than an equivalent white, there is productive inefficiency and a profit taking 
opportunity is foregone.  The firm rejects a highly qualified black person to hire a less qualified 
white.  Becker takes this foregone profit as evidence that the firm￿s managers are indulging a taste 
for discrimination. 
If marginal profits (or productivity) on equivalent persons can be measured, then the test 
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is a strong one.  But it is necessary to make sure that equivalents are being compared.  This test, 
like the traditional test, suffers from the same problems of omitted variables, unless special free 
entry conditions are assumed that arbitrage away marginal profits.  In that case, it is not necessary 
to control for productivity characteristics.  Entry guarantees that marginal profits are zero if there is 
no discrimination. 
The outcomes test is a black box method.  There is no need to look at what causes any 
disparity or what method the organization uses to select people.  It is unnecessary to control for any 
characteristics of the persons with whom the organization deals (chooses or rejects as transplant 
patients).  No control variables are necessary because the outcome being observed, the profit of the 
firm, is determined in a competitive market.  The absence of any control variables is perhaps what 
makes this test attractive to Ayres.  ￿[T]he outcome tests . . . are . . . not susceptible [to] the 
traditional omitted variable concern.￿  
However, the application of this test to the regulated environments in which transplants are 
performed, which are far from competitive markets with free entry, is not obvious.  A market in 
transplants would allocate scarce organs not only by the survivability of transplants, but the money 
value each transplant recipient placed on transplants compared with competing technologies like 
dialysis.  The rational consumer would also regard preventive habits and medical care as substitutes 
for transplants.  The marginal transplant would have a value determined by competing bidders for 
scarce organs.  Each person would be left to judge the degree of match for herself.  Wealthy people 
who are poor matches might choose to have many transplants a year.  Because the political process 
has not permitted such a market, we are in the position of having to define a welfare function to 
substitute as a mechanism for determining market outcomes. 
Ayres simplifies matters by taking survivability as the desired outcome.  At this point, he 
confuses his normative objective.  The choice of a welfare function (W in the model in Appendix 
A) will be highly controversial in the medical domain.  For determining whether there has been 
unjustified discrimination, however, survivability is a reasonable choice to measure outcomes since 
that has been widely accepted by medical decision-makers. 
When average black outcomes are inferior to average white outcomes, that is possible 
evidence of disparate impact.  But a basic principle in economics is that efficiency requires 
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equating at margins, which are much harder to measure.  If marginal outcomes are equal, any 
disparate impact is justified by disparities of productivity.  The outcomes test requires identifying 
the marginal white person and marginal black person.  Ayres recognizes this issue when he writes 
of the ￿infra-marginality problem.￿  The need to identify the ￿marginal￿ person from each racial 
group gets us back to the question of what criteria selected the marginal person and rejected others.  
This requires that the analyst open up the black box to postulate specific production processes and 
their relation to matches with persons. 
The outcomes test postulates that if the outcome levels of the marginal white and marginal 
black differ, there exists a person of the disfavored group who would have been more productive 
than the person chosen.  This is unjustified discrimination.  However if people are very 
heterogeneous, especially if people in one of the groups are very heterogeneous, that might not be 
the case.  Suppose there are a large number of ￿mediocre￿ whites in terms of productivity (or 
transplant survivability).  Suppose blacks are characterized by two sub-groups, a few extremely 
productive, but more who are extremely unproductive.  Then an equal opportunity practice would 
first select all the extremely productive blacks, then all the mediocre whites before coming to the 
extremely unproductive blacks.  If the number of available matches (positions, donated kidneys) 
falls in the mediocre range, the marginal black would have much higher productivity, but there 
would be no unjustified discrimination because of heterogeneity among people. 
Ayres looks to the outcomes test when he must move from finding disparate impact to 
finding unjustified disparate impact.  But his discussion of the outcomes test does not produce any 
answer to that question that helps his case against antigen matching.  Taking survival as the 
outcome, antigen matching is a good predictor.  Comparing two transplant regimes, a regime with 
antigen matching would show racial disparity but no discrimination, while a regime without 
antigen matching would show less disparity but discrimination against whites as more productive 
white transplant opportunities are turned away.  Avoiding the factual causes of disparity by 




5  A Productivity Framework for Analyzing Disparate Impact 
 
Appendix A develops a productivity model for evaluating the ￿legitimacy￿ of practices with 
a disparate impact.  The highly abstract model presented there uses the variable X to represent 
traits. X may be a vector of many productivity traits.  Here, we exposit the model. 
Taking productivity as the standard for measuring equality of opportunity, the framework is 
in the tradition of Griggs and McDonnell Douglas.  By providing a framework for elaborating 
￿business necessity￿ we aim to provide methods for evaluating the extension of disparate impact 
analysis to new domains and to relate disparate impact litigation to alternative and complementary 
policy interventions.  Developing parallels for the concept of productivity outside of the labor 
market and employment decisions of firms is a major challenge that Ayres does not adequately 
meet. 
Defining the analog to business necessity for the transplant domain is not so easy.  First of 
all, there is a question of scope.  Should we define ￿medical necessity￿ as what is necessary for 
successful transplants?  Or is kidney transplantation just one specific technology for producing 
health, and should the health outcome be defined with respect to the population at large and the 
multitude of health issues which affect it?  ￿Business necessity￿ has actually been developed in the 
light of firms making decisions in product markets, capital markets, and labor markets￿a very 
complex system. 
In the employment domain, the competitive market in which the firm operates brings local 
optimizing decisions into harmony with market-wide optimality in a ￿global￿ system.  Business 
necessity lets the firm lawfully use the most profitable practice for participation in the market.  
What makes profit maximizing decisions a ￿business necessity￿ is that in a competitive market, the 
firm that does not maximize will be replaced by those that do.  
The outcome test depends on specifying what the outcome is.  Ayres gets trapped in a 
contradiction.  After asserting the priority of his normative objective of decreasing racial disparity, 
he defines productivity as transplant survivability.  There is a tradeoff between lowering disparity 
and efficiency, but he provides no principled way to determine what the tradeoff should be or even 
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what the ￿price￿ of a certain amount of disparity in terms of efficiency is.  Finding no principle in a 
broader goal of health, he advocates a localized ￿normative￿ race-conscious adjustment.  Ayres 
falls back on an arbitrary political balancing of racial ￿equity￿ and ￿efficiency￿ because he fails to 
undertake the factual analysis that could inform political decisions that might unite equity and 
efficiency.  
  Unlike a firm￿s profit, transplant survivability is only technological.  It is not determined as 
an equilibrium between supply and demand in markets that incorporates individual preferences.  In 
order to maximize profit, firms need not only possess technological proficiency but must make 
products valued by customers.  These preferences and market decisions include ￿normative￿ beliefs 
of participating individuals.  
In the regulated transplant domain, that harmony of local and global efficiency does not 
obtain.  In these non-market situations, it is necessary to develop a ￿complete￿ model of 
productivity in the sense of a model that relates the plausible specification of a local outcome to 
some broader ￿global￿ definition of the outcome appropriate to the domain.  In the case of organ 
transplants, one plausible local definition is transplant survivability.  A contender for the global 
outcome is overall health of the population as a whole.  In a market, people would choose to 
undergo a transplant not as an end in itself but in order to obtain health.  
The standard for ￿completeness￿ is the economic one of including all substitutes and 
complements.  The economically motivated structural model would relate the mutual selection of 
persons and organizations to the global productivity of those matches.  The scope would expand or 
contract depending on the time frame.  In the longer run, there are more substitutes for any good. 
Most importantly, preventive medicine and health producing habits tend to be much more effective 
than heroic last stage measures like transplants. 
For purposes of preventing unlawful discrimination, a ￿firm￿ (healthcare provider, organ 
donation administrator) should be able to justify a practice on the basis of a medical necessity 
based either on local or global efficiency.  If the practice is more productive on the basis of either 




6  Discrimination and Other Causes of Racial Disparity  
We now discuss some additional aspects of Ayres￿ Three Tests. 
6.1  Testing for Disparate Impact 
There is discrimination in the sense of Becker if profitable opportunities are turned away. 
If the least profitable (productive) match (of transplant or employment technology) with a black 
person is more profitable than the least productive match with a white person, that indicates there is 
discrimination.  The organization is turning away potentially more profitable matches with blacks 
in order to select less capable whites. 
But how do we know the black person turned away would have produced a more profitable 
transaction?  The application of Becker￿s criterion is based on the assumption of competition and 
an implicit mathematical assumption of continuity.  But if people are very heterogeneous, there 
may be unique matches.  In the extreme, that is equivalent to ￿monopoly￿ and to discontinuity in 
the distribution of traits.  With moderate heterogeneity, there may just be very different 
distributions of traits across populations. 
Thus a key assumption of the optimal (most productive) solution in the mathematical model 
in Appendix A is continuity.  Persons differ in productive traits, but there are many close 
substitutes for any person.  If that is not true, Becker￿s profits test, modified to a general criterion, 
breaks down.  We now discuss further aspects of the three tests. 
Should tests for discrimination be conditional on measured characteristics (traits)?  The 
answer is ￿yes￿ in both disparate treatment and disparate impact tests.  We have shown that Ayres￿ 
contrast between tests of disparate impact and disparate treatment is overstated.  In both types of 
test it is legitimate and necessary to include relevant X variables.  Contrary to what he claims, 
there is no formal test for omitted variable bias. 
Note that disparate impact tests (as used by Ayres) assume that it is known if X is 
productive. We need to test the ingredients of the model, and break up the analysis into analyses of 
technology, preferences, and outcomes.  Looking only at outcomes (the average group disparity 
result) as is traditional in tests of discrimination is not informative. 
The framework presented in Appendix A models how productive traits should be utilized. 
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Optimality implies that the same cutoffs (in ￿scores￿ on tests for matching) be used for both race 
groups, provided that the same technology is appropriate for them.  However we may go to a corner 
solution￿all whites and no blacks, or all blacks and no whites are hired (or given organs).  This 
can happen if members of one group have very low endowments of the productive trait (poor 
antigen matches) compared with the other group.  But if there are no corner solutions, so some 
members of both groups are hired (given organ transplants), optimality requires that marginal 
returns for both groups are equalized, as long as the same technology is the best for each group.  
Average returns of those hired may be different across groups unless the productivity traits are 
equally distributed.  If the marginal profitability is the same across race groups, there is no 
discrimination as measured by the Becker test.  If marginal returns are not equalized, the firm (or 
decision-maker) is acting inefficiently. Disparity can be measured by the foregone profit 
opportunity. 
If there is no discrimination (judged by the productivity standard) marginal returns are 
equal but average returns may not be.  With heterogeneous traits, and selection proceeding from the 
most to the least productive, there are diminishing returns to the scale of operation.  If minorities 
have a less favorable distribution of productive traits, there would be disparity in enrollment 
proportion of minorities away from the population proportion of minorities. 
This analysis emphasizes the importance of controlling for productivity traits and for 
looking at marginal persons in order to detect discrimination.  In this model, racial disparity in 
selection for productive relationships (employment, transplants) may not be due to discrimination 
but may be the consequence of differences in the distributions of productive traits among groups.  
The right test for discrimination is to see if the optimal selection conditions hold.  If the 
investigator performs the sleight of hand of confusing average with marginal, it becomes a test of 
disparity, not of unjustified disparity, just like Ayres￿ omitted variables test. 
Technology may not be uniformly effective across racial groups.  Disparate impact theory 
asks that the best practice (business justified practice) be used.  We can write the problem as a 
possible choice of race-specific technology (as in disparate impact cases) where we now allow for 
different technology and costs.  Different antigen matching rates may affect the best choice of 
technology by race (organ transplant or dialysis therapy).  It is known that blacks fare better on 
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dialysis than whites and black rejection rates exceed those of whites. Optimality and no bias in this 
case requires using the best mix of technologies but not necessarily the same cut off criterion for 
each racial group.  Becker￿s test still applies. 
Marginal profitability is equalized if hospitals are not indulging their tastes for 
discrimination and a different cut-off level is used for black and whites.  Disparity may increase or 
decrease when alternative technologies are available.  Allowing for differences in efficacy of 
technology by race produces a technology choice which is race-specific but not racist.  Bias is 
present if there are departures from productive optimality.  This can arise if different welfare 
functions W are used to evaluate black and white outcomes.  We can separate bias from technology 
in principle, if we can measure true productivity. 
Ayres considers the possibility of racial differences in technology in terms of the ￿subgroup 
validity problem.￿  ￿To put the matter provocatively, when a particular observable characteristic is 
only a valid proxy of desert for some races then a decisionmaker￿s unwillingness to engage in 
disparate racial treatment may induce just the racial disparities in outcomes that are generally a 
concern￿ (Ayres 2004). 
 
6.2 Tainted  Variables 
In Ayres￿ view, the problem with regression models that purport to explain disparities in 
rewards as caused not by an employer￿s practices but by other variables (that measure traits of the 
person) is that these traits are the result of past discrimination, by Jim Crow, and by slavery itself. 
Ayres￿ omitted variables test does not determine if a selection criterion X is a legitimate 
productivity attribute or a smokescreen￿the essential question in disparate impact cases.  The 
problem of ￿tainted variables￿ is potentially serious.  Consider, for example, the preferences by 
which a patient would evaluate productive outcomes.  Market evaluation (profit) is partly 
determined by preferences of customers.  The policy maker￿s welfare function W in the 
mathematical setup of Appendix A might also be based on patients￿ preferences.  If a person 
prefers dialysis to a transplant, should that be taken into account?  If there are differences in 
preferences across racial groups, are those preference differences appropriate control variables?  
Suppose preferences differ with race, and suppose preferences for dialysis are based on fear of risks 
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of transplant operations.  Suppose such fears are influenced by the perception that the medical 
establishment is hostile to blacks.  Suppose past discrimination has caused distrust.  Yet if blacks 
are resistant to a certain treatment for whatever reason, it may be legitimate to respect their wishes 
whether or not they are well-founded. 
 
6.3  Causal Responsibility of the Plaintiff 
 
Disparate outcomes arise most immediately from a person￿s interaction with some 
institution or organization.  Proximate causes are to be found in the practices by which people 
match to organizations and the productivity of those matches.  However, failures to create matches 
may be influenced by many antecedent causes.  There are many ways in which the plaintiff (in an 
employment disparate impact case) has influence over the adverse outcome.  In the long run, he can 
invest in more training.  In the short run, he can search for better opportunities and bargain for 
better terms.  
In the health domain, the preferences and initiatives of potential patients are critical to 
outcomes.  Where equity should come in is in devising the best remedy for the fact that some 
people have bad health outcomes regardless of what their race is.  Race neutral policies which tend 
to improve the health of the American population as a whole will have a disparate impact favoring 
blacks.  When we ask at a program level what would remedy defective outcomes, promoting 
health-producing habits in the potential patient plays a major role.  When we ask how to ￿reform 
the system,￿ ways to make people masters of their fate are critical.  Focus on ￿discrimination￿ is 
more than a distraction.  ￿Disparate impact￿ focuses on practices before which the individual is 
helpless. Griggs was concerned about ￿childhood deficiencies in the education and background of 
minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control￿ (McDonnell Douglas v. Green 401 
U.S. 424, 431 [1971]).  A major improvement in the health ￿system￿ is to increase the awareness of 




6.4  The Problem of Statistical Discrimination 
Ayres is correct that the Becker profits test does not detect statistical discrimination.  If race 
accurately signals the presence of some productive opportunity, the firm could use that race 
information to make productive matches.  In the presence of statistical discrimination, profits are 
the same for both groups of workers or transplantees.  The profits criterion tests for disparate 
treatment or a selection practice with disparate impact that is productively irrational in the Griggs 
sense of having no business justification. However, we cannot separate statistical discrimination 
from no discrimination by this test. 
7  The Economic Point of View 
Ayres urges that disparate impact analysis be extended to domains beyond employment 
discrimination.  But his analysis does not provide an adequate framework for such an extension.  
His conception of ￿disparate impact￿ is not that defined in Griggs and subsequent cases.  The 
Supreme Court in Griggs emphasized that the goal of disparate impact analysis is equality of 
opportunity but not ￿preference for any group, minority or majority.￿ (401 U.S. 424, 431)  Supreme 
Court decisions do not demand a tradeoff between lowering disparity and efficiency (or profit).  
They regard inefficient (profit sacrificing) practices as suspect from an equal opportunity point of 
view. 
Ayres writes that ￿If past government discrimination has caused elevated African American 
demand for kidney transplantation, could this not justify race-conscious efforts to mitigate the 
injury?￿ (Ayres 2001, 221).  Advocating deliberate race-conscious policies is not in the spirit of 
Griggs or McDonnell Douglas.  It risks promoting, not diminishing, the ￿racial animus￿ he seeks to 
counter.  
Ayres devises his own interplay of disparate impact and disparate treatment doctrine.  Once 
disparate impact has been discovered, ignoring it becomes disparate treatment, even if the disparate 
impact might have been justified by ￿business necessity.￿  Thus he argues that ￿ignoring the 
disparate impact of blacks represents selective indifference￿ (Ayres 2001, 205). 
 
Even for those who believe that the best allocation should simply try to maximize survival 
rates, the willingness of the system to respond selectively to other 
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equitable claims might argue for considering the claims of blacks as well. In a 
world where the equitable claims of other discrete groups are heard, UNOS￿s failure to 
respond to the equitable claims of black patients becomes suspect. (Ayres 
2001, 205-06) 
 
Ending racial disparity at the final stage of the kidney transplant domain might require vast 
expenditure of resources.  Such resources might save more lives if they were devoted to preventive 
medicine.  The economic point of view looks to all of the tradeoffs that are implicit in any policy 
choice.  Ayres￿ narrowly focused analysis illustrates the limitations of the disparate impact 
approach to tackling racial disparities.  One can sue over any disparate impact of a health insurance 
reimbursement policy, but not over the fact that the poor (and blacks) tend to have less health 
insurance.  Suits are more effective against end stage selection practices, but not against root 
causes. Extending disparate impact liability directs attention and resources away from dealing with 
root causes of disparities. 
25Appendices
A Formal Statement of the Ingredients Needed to Mea-
sure Disparate Impact
A.1 Socially Optimal Allocation Rules and Their Implications for
Testing for Disparate Impacts
Let FB (X) be the distribution of traits X in the black population and FW(X) be the
distribution of traits in the white population. The technology j mapping X −→ Y is
Y = gj(X). Y is some output.
A trait is productive if gj(X) is an increasing function of the trait. We initially assume
a common technology across all race groups. Cj(X) i st h ec o s to fu s i n gt e c h n o l o g yj.T h e
output evaluation of Y is W (Y ). In a business setting where Y is output for the market
W (Y )=PYY ,w h e r ePY is the price of the output. W (Y ) may also re￿ect preferences of
the relevant decision-making agents. Assume that C(X) is convex increasing in X; gj(X) is
concave increasing in X; and W(gj(X)) is concave increasing in X.
Net welfare (in utility) of technology j with characteristics X is
W (gj(X)) − Cj(X). (A.1)
For a given technology overall (normalizing the size of the population to equal 1) net welfare
26in the population is
Vj =m a x
RW,RB
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. (A.2)
Here RW and RB are the regions of X characteristics for whites and blacks, respectively,
who are given jobs, organs, credit, etc. PW is proportion of whites in overall population.
PB is proportion of blacks. PB + PW =1 . Implicit in this formulation is the de￿nition
of a relevant population and the total number of transplants, jobs, etc. available. λ is a
multiplier measuring scarcity of jobs, organs, etc. µ is the number of transplants available
relative to the total population.
Consider a scalar case, RW = rW,R B = rB (scalars). This means there is only one scalar
attribute X. We can rewrite the problem as
Vj =m a x
rW,rB
⎧
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. (A.3)
Assuming interior solutions to the ￿rst order conditions, we obtain optimal cut-oﬀ values
(rB and rW) from the following optimality conditions,
[W (gj(rW)) − Cj(rW)] •PWfW(rW)= PWfW(rW)
[W (gj(rB)) − Cj(rB)] •PBfB(rB)= PBfB(rB).
(A.4)
27(Here fQ is the density of the random variable Q which is assumed to exist.) Therefore
rW = rB = r from concavity and interiority. The same cutoﬀs are used for both race groups.
However, we may go to a corner￿no blacks or no whites hired (given organs). This can
happen if one group has very low endowments (poor antigen matches). Marginal returns for
both groups are equalized as long as both are hired. Average returns of those hired may
be diﬀerent across groups unless FW = FB, so productivity traits are equally distributed.
Observe that if W (Y )=PYY so the goal is pro￿t maximization, marginal pro￿tability is
the same across race groups. This is Becker￿s (1993a,b) test for discrimination. If returns
are not equalized, then ￿rms (or decision-makers) are acting ineﬃciently. Assuming interior








In general, unless distributions of characteristics are the same in the two groups, we get a
disparity in enrollment of minorities away from the population proportion if we set marginal
returns equal across groups. Marginal returns are equalized but average returns are not
if there are diminishing returns. This analysis emphasizes the importance of controlling
for productivity traits and for looking at marginal persons in making judgements about
discrimination.
In this model racial disparity in treatment of employment is a consequence of diﬀerences
in the distributions of X among groups. The right test is to see if equations (A.4) hold and
to con￿rm if there are productivity (gj) or cost (Cj) eﬀects of X. If there is no eﬀect on
28productivity or cost, there is no basis for using the trait to screen blacks from whites. We
next consider the implications of alternative technologies.
A.2 Allowing for Race Speci￿c Technologies and Costs
Technology may not be uniformly eﬀective across racial groups. Disparate impact theory
asks that best practice (business justi￿ed practice) be used. We can write the problem as
a possible choice of race-speci￿c technology (as in disparate impact cases) where we now
subscript technology and costs. Diﬀerent antigen matching rates may aﬀect the best choice
of technology by race (organ transplant or therapy). It is known that blacks fare better on
dialysis than whites and black rejection rates exceed those of whites. Diﬀerent workplace
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. (A.6)
We allow for the possibility that diﬀerent technologies will be selected for diﬀerent groups.
Suppose ￿ jB 6=￿ jW (diﬀerent technologies and costs are optimal for diﬀerent groups). Opti-
mality requires (in the scalar case)
PW [(W (gjW(rW)) − CjW(rW))fW (rW)] = λPWfW (rW)
PB [(W (gjB(rB)) − CjB(rB))fB (rB)] = λPBfB (rB).
(A.7)
29Assuming interior solutions, W (gjB(rB)) − CjB(rB)=W (gjW(rW)) − CjW(rW). In general,
no longer does the same cut-oﬀ criterion apply at the margin (in general rW 6= rB). Thus,
optimality and no bias would not necessarily produce the same cut-oﬀ rule across race groups.
However, Becker￿s test still applies. Marginal pro￿tability is equalized if agents are not
indulging their tastes for discrimination even if a diﬀerent cut-oﬀ level is used for blacks and
whites.
Disparity may increase or decrease when alternative technologies are available. Allowing
for diﬀerences in eﬃcacy of technology by race produces a technology choice which is race-
speci￿c but not racist. Bias is present if there are departures from (A.7). This can arise if
ad i ﬀerent W is used for blacks than for whites. Thus we can separate bias from technology
in principle, if we can measure true productivity.
A.3 Testing for Disparate Impact
We can use this setup to test for disparate impacts. The ￿rst step is to ask:
1. Does an element of X appear in cost Cj(X) or output gj(X)? This is the test that
must be done to determine business necessity within a given technology.
2. Is the weighting of the X (the choice of RB or RW)d i ﬀerent from optimal? If so, there
is intentional bias. This arises from unequal weighting of black and white outcomes
due to decision-maker preference. This test looks for departures from (A.4) or (A.7).
Ayres￿ contrast between tests of disparate impact and disparate treatment is overstated.
In both types of test it is legitimate and necessary to include relevant X variables. Contrary
30to what he claims, there is no formal test for omitted variable bias.1 Note that disparate
impact tests (as used by Ayres) assume it is known if X is productive. We need to test the
ingredients of the model, and break up the analysis into analyses of technology, preferences
and outcomes. Looking only at outcome equations is not informative.
A.4 Tests of Outcomes
1. Should they be conditional or not? (Should we condition on measured characteristics?)
The answer is ￿yes￿, in both disparate treatment and disparate impact tests.
2. The use of unconditional tests of the sort advocated by Becker (1993a, b) requires
that free entry characterize the industry or activity being studied. Otherwise marginal
pro￿tability diﬀerences across race groups may be due to a lack of competition.
3. As correctly noted by Ayres, if productivity is the same, under statistical discrimina-
tion, pro￿ts are the same for both groups. Under animus-based discrimination, pro￿ts
are higher in transactions with blacks. Therefore, we can test between the two mod-
els under free entry. However, we cannot separate statistical discrimination from no
discrimination by this test.
A.5 Disparate Impact Alternatives
We can use this framework to test the feasibility of disparate impact alternatives. One
version of this policy is to minimize discrepancy in employment (receipt of organs, etc.) by
1Gastwirth (1988, 1992, 1996) presents methods based on the Corn￿eld inequality for determining the
sensitivity of estimates to omitted characteristics.
31choosing techniques so that a given level of pro￿tability is maintained. Thus we can choose
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[W (gjW (X)) − CjW (X)]fW (X)dX.
Observe that this policy may not produce the maximum pro￿t result and diﬀerent technolo-
gies may be used for diﬀerent race groups. The analysis of this appendix illustrates the value
of going beyond simple regressions to determine the ingredients of tastes, technology and
endowments that produce outcomes.
32B Conventional Methods for Measuring Discrimina-
tion
The conventional approach to testing for discrimination works with some ￿nal outcome
equation￿a wage, an employment rate or the allocation rate of organs￿to detect discrim-
ination. Underlying this approach are two sets of equations: (a) outcome equations and
(b) equations determining traits or characteristics denoted X.L e tYW be the white outcome
and YB be the black outcome.
The ￿rst set of equations is for outcomes:
YW = α0W + α1WX + ηW
YB = α0B + α1BX + ηB.
The means of ηW and ηB are zero. α0W and α0B capture both unmeasured productivity
traits and unmeasured sources of discrimination. Since they are unmeasured, we cannot tell
which source of disparity is more important. These equations record how characteristics
measured (X) and unmeasured (ηW,ηB) characteristics determine outcomes for whites and
blacks. Assume there is only one X. Lack of disparate treatment means that α0W = α0B and
α1W = α1B. Persons with identical values of traits are treated equally. Disparate treatment
arises if α0W 6= α0B or α1W 6= α1B or both. Let D =1if a person is black; D =0otherwise.
33Then observed outcomes are
Y = DYB +( 1− D)YW
= α0W +( α0B − α0W)D + α1WX +( α1W − α1B)DX
+ηW (1 − D)+ηBD.
If all relevant productivity traits are measured, least squares estimates are unbiased. A
negative estimated coeﬃcient on D means that on average blacks do worse, either because
of discrimination or because of lower levels of productivity traits. A negative estimated
coeﬃcient on DX means that as productivity traits increase blacks receive a smaller increase
in payment (employment, organ transplantation) than whites.
To simplify the argument suppose that α1W = α1B = α1. Then the outcome equation is
Y = α0W + ∆D + α1X + η, (B.1)
where ∆ = α0B − α0W and η = ηW (1 − D)+ηBD. Good (unbiased) estimates of the para-
meters of this equation can sometimes detect the presence or absence of disparate treatment.
The assumptions underlying application of this equation as a measurement framework
are: (1) That X accurately captures all relevant productivity factors. Thus D is uncorrelated
with η. The estimated (α0B − α0W)=∆ captures discrimination. Of course, if this is not
true, the least squares estimates of ∆ re￿ect both discrimination and unobserved productiv-
ity. (2) A second assumption is that X is uncorrelated with (ηW,ηB). A correlation could
34arise if ηW and ηB are correlated with unmeasured factors causing X.
Thus we can write
XW = β0W + νW
XB = β0B + νB,
where νW and νB have zero means and are independent of each other. Observed X is
X = DXB +( 1− D)XW (B.2)
= β0W +( β0B − β0W)D + ν,
where ν = νW (1 − D)+νBD.N o wi fνB is positively correlated with ηB and νW is positively
correlated with ηW,s a yb e c a u s em o r ep r o d u c t i v ep e o p l e( t h o s ew i t hh i g h e rη)g e tm o r e
training (X),a n dηB is uncorrelated with νW and ηW is uncorrelated with νB, then one
can show that if β0B <β 0W (blacks get less training), the least squares estimate of ∆ is
upward biased as is the least squares estimate of α1.I fβ0B = β0W, the OLS estimate of ∆,
￿ ∆ is unbiased for ∆ and if β0B >β 0W, b ∆ is downward biased for ∆. See the derivations in
A p p e n d i xC .T h er e a s o nf o rt h eu p w a r db i a si nt h ec o e ﬃcient of α1 is intuitively obvious.
The regression gives too much credit to X and not to ν. The estimated coeﬃcient for α1
picks up some of the eﬀect of the unmeasured ηW and ηB which positively aﬀect the outcome.
T h eu p w a r db i a sf o r∆ is less obvious. Some of the bias arising from the X-η relationship
gets shared with D. D is uncorrelated with η and is negatively correlated with X.S e et h e
35analysis of Appendix C.
This means that if there is disparity in X,a n dX is ￿tainted￿ (correlated with η), then
if higher levels of the η are associated with higher levels of the ν, and there is no disparate
treatment (∆ =0 ) , the estimated ∆ is positive, suggesting blacks are favored.
One way to undo this bias is to use the method of instrumental variables. If there is a
variable Z correlated with X a n du n c o r r e l a t e dw i t hη, application of the method produces
unbiased estimates of α1 and ∆.2
Ayres￿ ￿solution￿ is diﬀerent. It is to delete the X, and run the regression. When ∆ =0
(no disparate impact), this is equivalent to running a regression of X on D (See Appendix C).
The procedure can detect disparity in X b yr a c e . I tc a n n o tr e v e a lw h yt h e r ei sd i s p a r i t y .
Ayres￿ solution does not answer the question of whether there is disparate impact. It simply
tells us there is disparity. Ayres confuses disparity with disparate impact.
Ayres￿ discussion of omitted variable bias is confusing. There is no formal test for omitted
variable bias unless we can measure the omitted variables in which case there need be no
bias. There is no mechanical algorithm for picking which variables belong in X when the X
are correlated with ν (See, e.g., Heckman and Navarro, 2004).
The real message to take from Ayres￿ paper is not that X variables should be omitted
when testing for disparate treatment and should be included when testing for disparate
treatment. The real message is that regressions based on (B.1) cannot separate out bias
from endowments. They cannot determine whether X is a genuine productivity attribute.
The only way to do that is to ￿nd measures of productivity or pro￿tability, instead of
2See, e.g., Greene (2003) for a discussion of the method of instrumental variables.
36outcomes of an allocation or wage-setting process, against which to measure the eﬀect of
X.3
3Measurement error in X raises a whole set of other problems. Omitting or including variables measured
with error may bias α1 and ∆ in any direction if X has many variables.
37C A Model of Disparate Impacts with a Tainted Vari-
able




































Cov(X,η)=E (Xη)=E (Xη | D =1 )P + E (Xη | D =0 )( 1− P)
because E (η)=0 .N o t i c et h a t
E (Xη | D =1 ) = E [(β0B + νB)ηB | D =1 ]
= E (νBηB).
E (Xη | D =0 ) = E [(β0W + νW)ηW | D =0 ]
= E(νWηW)
E (Xη)=PE(νBηB)+( 1− P)(νWηW).
Cov(X,D)=P (1 − P)(β0B − β0W).
38Cov(D,ν)=0from the de￿nition of the error term (E (νB)=0 , E (νW)=0and ν =
DνB+(1− D)νW). De￿ne |det| as the determinant of the regressor matrix which is assumed









⎠ = |det| > 0.




































Assuming that β0B − β0W < 0 (disparity in X)a n dt h a tE (νBηB) > 0 and E(νWηW) > 0
(more X for more productive people), b ∆ is upward biased. Assume no disparate treatment
so ∆ =0 , b ∆ > 0. Thus the regression with a tainted X would show favoritism for blacks.
Note further that ￿ α1 is upward biased for α1.
Suppose we omit X as Ayres suggests for his test for disparate impact. This produces
the equation
Y = α0 + ∆D + {α1X + η}.
Least squares under the assumption of no disparate impact (∆ =0 )i s




39Summarizing, we obtain in the general case
plim e ∆ =( α1)(β0B − β0W)+∆,
plim b ∆ = −
Cov(X,D)
|det|
[E (νBηB)P + E (νWηW)(1− P)] + ∆
= −
P (1 − P)
|det|
(β0B − β0W)[E (νBηB)P + E (νWηW)(1− P)] + ∆.
When ∆ =0(no disparate treatment in the outcome equation), we have that if there is
disparity in the trait (β0B − β0W) < 0 and α1 > 0, plim e ∆ < 0. But plim b ∆ > 0,w h i c h
might suggest favoritism for blacks. Thus if there is disparity, whatever the source, Ayres will
detect it. When ∆ =0 , the Ayres method amounts to regressing X on D, circumventing the
outcome equation completely. Such a regression cannot decide the sources of the disparity. It
also does not test if X is a legitimate productivity attribute or a smokescreen￿the essential
question in disparate impact cases.
If there is an instrument Z such that E(Zν)=0 , E(ZX) 6=0 , the instrumental variable
estimator of ∆ is consistent for the parameter. Thus if including X in the regression shows
favoritism for blacks (plim b ∆ > 0) but the IV estimator shows none, we also have evidence
of disparity, but not necessarily any form of discrimination.
Notice further that if acquisition of the trait is unrelated to ν (Cov(ν,η)=0so
E (νBηB)=0and E (νWηW)=0 ), the standard method (and the instrumental variable
method) will show no bias (plim b ∆ =0 ). These tests are for the presence or absence of
disparate treatment assuming X is correctly measured.
Note further that if β0B = β0W, plim b ∆ =0and plim e ∆ =0even if E (νBηB) 6=
40E (νWηW). Unequal dependence between unobservables in productivity traits and unob-
servables in outcomes across race groups is another type of disparity in treatment that is oﬀ
the radar screen of these tests. Methods based on ￿tting (B.1) or regressing X on D do not
provide a way of testing for disparate impact.
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